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Abstract
Intertemporal choice experiments are increasingly implemented to make inference
about discounting and marginal utility, yet little is known about the predictive power
of resulting measures. This project links standard experimental choices to a decision on
the desire to smooth a large-stakes payment — around 10% of annual income — through
time. In a sample of around 400 Guatemalan Conditional Cash Transfer recipients, we
find that preferences over large-stakes payment plans are closely predicted by experimental
measures of patience and diminishing marginal utility. These represent the first findings
in the literature on the predictive content of such experimentally elicited measures of
discounting and marginal utility for a large-stakes decision.

JEL classification: D1, D3, D90
Keywords: Structural estimation, Out-of-sample prediction, Discounting, Convex Time Budget
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Introduction

Intertemporal choice is prevalent in economic decision making. Explicit characterization of
structural discounting models has led to widely appreciated theoretical developments (Samuelson, 1937; Koopmans, 1960; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). Measurement of
the broad forces of these models and corresponding utility parameters has received deserved
empirical attention as well, with notable contributions in both laboratory and field settings.1
A prominent discussion related to the measurement of intertemporal preferences has developed in the last decade. Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) note a critical issue: the
confounding effects of diminishing marginal utility for making inference on patience. A decision
maker who is indifferent between $45 today and $50 in one month can be arbitrarily impatient
depending on changes in utility over this range.2 Diminishing marginal utility confounds both
quantitative and qualitative predictions of measured discounting models. Erroneous inference
on the level of discounting will lead to poor quantitative out-of-sample prediction; while attributing to discounting a behavior that is truly driven by diminishing marginal utility may
lead even qualitative predictions to be incorrect.
Recent works have developed experimental methodologies to identify diminishing marginal
utility alongside discounting parameters (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2008; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012).3 Those works show that estimates of discounting are indeed influenced by the shape of utility. Thus, experimental behavior previously attributed to discounting
may indeed reflect diminishing marginal utility. Following this work, experimental economics
1

Examples include Hausman (1979); Lawrance (1991); Warner and Pleeter (2001); Harrison, Lau and
Williams (2002); Cagetti (2003); DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006); Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2007);
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008); Mahajan and Tarozzi (2011); Andreoni and Sprenger (2012);
Fang and Wang (2015).
2
An individual indifferent between $45 received now and $50 received in one month under exponential
discounting reveals u(45)/u(50) = δ. Let k = u(50) − u(45) represent the change in utility between $45 and $50,
such that k/u(50) = 1 − δ. Normalizing u(0) = 0, values of k ∈ (0, u(50)) are consistent with strict monotonicity
of u(·). As k → 0, δ → 1 and as k → u(50), δ → 0.
3
The methodologies of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012)
share a common objective, but reach starkly different conclusions with respect to marginal utility, perhaps due
to the source of information used to identify marginal utility. Appendix A contains a detailed discussion of this
topic.
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has revisited the measurement of discounting accounting for marginal utility. For example,
Imai, Rutter and Camerer (2019) document 67 experimental manuscripts implementing the
Convex Time Budget (CTB) methodology of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and summarize
220 estimates of discounting therefrom.
While evidence has accumulated on the value of experimental methods eliciting discounting
and marginal utility, it is largely unknown whether the corresponding parameters meaningfully
predict large-stakes behavior. This gap in the literature is potentially important. If experimental choices are reflective of time preferences and diminishing marginal utility, they should
predict relevant large-stakes decision-making outside of the experiment. If not, then the growing body of literature making inference on preferences from these designs is missing a critical
piece of foundation.
Our project seeks to fill this gap in the literature by linking experimental choices in the CTB
design and corresponding preference estimates for discounting and marginal utility to a largestakes decision: how to smooth intertemporal payments valuing around 10% of annual income.
Our data come from a low-income, low-literacy and low-numeracy sample of 490 participants in
Guatemala’s “Mi Bono Seguro” Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program.4 In a first task, all
subjects completed the modified CTB tasks of Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015). Subjects
allocate an experimental budget over two payment dates, one sooner and one later. In such
designs, choosing interior allocations with smooth payments over the two dates is interpreted
as evidence of diminishing marginal utility, while allocating more funds to the sooner date is
interpreted as reflecting greater impatience.5
Then, in a second task, subjects were entered into a draw with a one-in-thirty chance of receiving GTQ1,200 (around $164). This amount represents at least sixty percent of the monthly
4

Relative to most laboratory samples, we view these subjects as potentially more likely to be confused by
arguably complex experimental designs. Critiques about comprehensibility noted below support the hypothesis
that experimental choices are reflective of confusion rather than preferences, which should lead to limited
predictive power.
5
The stakes of the CTB decisions were GTQ100 Guatemalan Quetzales (around USD12.8 at the time of the
experiment). These stakes themselves are not insubstantial, representing two-thirds of the monthly transfer for
eligible recipients from the “Mi Bono Seguro” program.
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household income for most (87%) of our subjects, and more than one month’s household income
for the median subject. Each subject was asked to choose one of six structured payment plans,
which would be implemented if they won the draw. The first payment plan was a single lumpsum payment of GTQ1,200 received on a fixed date after the experiment. The other payment
plans featured multiple smaller payments with equal total value, such as two GTQ600 payments
received three months apart. Diminishing marginal utility and patience should jointly inform
plan values. A more patient individual with more rapidly diminishing marginal utility should
express a greater desire for multiple payment plans rather than the single payment plan.
We document several results related to diminishing marginal utility, patience, and payment
plan preferences. First, relative to laboratory samples with college students, our sample shows
a much greater desire to smooth their CTB allocations over time. Forty-six percent of CTB
choices are interior allocations and only 8.4% of subjects exhibit zero interior choices. For
comparison, with a sample of University of California San Diego (UCSD) undergraduates,
Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) find only 12% interior allocations and that 60% of subjects
exhibit zero interior choices. Corresponding structural estimates of preferences demonstrate
marginal utility decreasing substantially over the CTB payment values, reflecting the preference
for smooth intertemporal payments.6 Subjects are estimated to discount the future at around
1.73% per month, or 23.20% per year. Given these estimates of marginal utility and patience,
multiple payment plans should be around 20% more valuable on average than the single payment
plan. Echoing this aggregate prediction, 78% of subjects actually chose one of these smooth
payment plans.
Second, preferences over payment plans are closely in accordance with CTB behavior and
estimated preferences. In reduced form, subjects who chose the single payment plan made
significantly more impatient and significantly fewer interior CTB allocations than those who
chose smooth payment plans. Correspondingly, subjects who chose the single payment plan
have estimated discounted utility functions that are significantly less concave and less patient
6

Although diminishing marginal utility is estimated to be substantial, it is still very far from estimates
informed by risky choice experiments (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2008).
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than subjects who chose smooth payment plans. These differential estimates generate starkly
different estimated plan values. Subjects who chose the single payment plan are estimated to
value the single payment plan around 10% more than the average smooth payment plan. Subjects who chose smooth payment plans are estimated to value the average smooth payment plan
around 35% more than the single payment plan. Individual preference estimates corroborate
these findings with sharp differences in estimated preferences and plan values across single and
smooth payment choice subjects.
To the best of our knowledge, our findings are the first to examine the predictive content of
experimentally elicited measures of discounting and marginal utility for a large-stakes decision.
Other works have examined correlations between experimental measures of discounting and
measures such as self-reported smoking, diet and exercise, credit card borrowing and default,
short-term effort decisions, small-stakes monetary tradeoffs, take up of savings commitment devices, and tax-filing behavior (Chabris, Laibson, Morris, Schuldt and Taubinsky, 2008b; Meier
and Sprenger, 2010, 2012; Andreoni, Callen, Khan, Jaffar and Sprenger, 2018b; Ashraf, Karlan and Yin, 2006; Martinez, Meier and Sprenger, 2017; Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger, 2015).
Although those works point helpfully towards the predictive content of experimental measures
for low-to-moderate stakes with single and repeated decisions, they arguably do not investigate large-stakes decisions. And, with the exception of Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015);
Andreoni, Callen, Khan, Jaffar and Sprenger (2018b), they do not utilize methods like the
CTB designed to simultaneously elicit discounting and marginal utility. As such, the identified
correlations may confound the relationships between the behavior of interest, discounting and
marginal utility. An additional strand of work examines the correlation between experimental measures of discounting and socio-demographics such as education, income, and wealth.
Notable among these efforts are Harrison et al. (2002) and Epper, Fehr, Fehr-Duda, Kreiner,
Lassen, Leth-Petersen and Rasmussen (2020), who document correlations between measures of
patience and income or wealth in broad samples of the Danish population; the latter implementing the CTB method. While such outcomes are substantial, they are likely the product
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of many choices. Additionally, Epper et al. (2020) do not distinguish between discounting and
marginal utility in their analysis, using a single non-parametric index to summarize experimental behavior. Recognizing this literature, our manuscript adds detailed information on a
single large-stakes decision for which precise predictions on the effects of both discounting and
marginal utility can be made.
Our specific application yields several additional contributions and implications. First, a
literature has recently evolved that questions the use of monetary payments in the measurement of time preferences. When liquidity constraints are absent, monetary discounting choices
should reveal nothing about individual consumption preferences, only the interval of borrowing
and lending rates (for discussion, see Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris, Laibson and Schuldt,
2008a; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). Further, in CTB designs these arbitrage arguments
imply that only corner solutions, consistent with maximizing present value at the market interest rate, should be observed. Indeed, Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015); Sprenger
(2015) interpret the preponderance of corner solutions in monetary choice for college samples
as potential evidence of arbitrage. However, our subjects are particularly likely to be liquidity
constrained, as they are uniformly of low income, with 92.2% having no savings in any financial
institution and 86.6% reporting never having used a credit card. Indeed, these subjects seem
to use both the CTB experiment and the structured payment plans to smooth consumption
over time. In the discussion of the use of monetary payments to elicit discounting, it may be
particularly valuable to explicitly measure liquidity constraints and examine the proportion of
CTB interior solutions to evaluate the plausibility of arbitrage, and hence the plausibility that
true intertemporal preferences are being captured in experimental response.
Second, contracts such as our structured payment plans are a frequent form of contract
choice (examples include lottery payment, lawsuit payment, annuity buyouts, leases, and rentto-own agreements). Our analysis shows that predicting these temporal contract choices is
greatly aided by the measurement of diminishing marginal utility. We make this point concretely in our analysis by demonstrating a sharp drop in predictive value when ignoring differ-
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ences in marginal utility across subjects.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our study environment and implementation. Section 3 presents results for reduced form analysis, structural estimation and large stake
choice predictions and robustness tests. Section 4 concludes.

2

Experimental Design and Measurement of Time Preferences

2.1

Environment and Sample

The data that are used in this paper are from an artefactual field experiment conducted in
Guatemala in 2013. Our sample consists of 490 participants in Guatemala’s “Mi Bono Seguro”
CCT program. “Mi Bono Seguro” is a targeted CCT program overseen by Guatemala’s Ministry
of Social Development. Program participants can receive transfers of GTQ150 (approximately
USD19.2) per month for health, education, or both, provided all household members comply
with the conditions.
Panel A of Table 1 provides demographic characteristics for our sample of subjects. Due
to program requirements, our sample is not representative of the Guatemalan population. Our
subjects are primarily married women between the ages of 18 and 76 years (mean 36 years,
median 35 years), with children.7 Our sample is comprised of impoverished households. Panel
B of Table 1 shows that roughly sixty percent of our sample reports monthly household earnings
of less than GTQ1,000 (USD128).
Panel C of Table 1 documents the levels of financial assets and access among our sample.
Around two-thirds of the study participants have never had a savings account, while nearly
eighty percent have never had a checking account and almost ninety percent have never used
a credit card. This suggests quite limited access to liquidity for our sample. Panel D of
7

As with most CCT programs, funds are usually disbursed to adult women within a recipient household.
Exceptions are only made when there is no adult woman present. For instance, if a mother is not yet eighteen
years old or has passed away, then funds are disbursed to an adult male in the household.
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Table 1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics
Characteristic

Full Sample
#Obs Mean [Median]
(s.e)

Analysis sample
#Obs Mean [Median]
(s.e)

Panel A: Socio-Demographics Information
Female
Age

490
470

Married or with Partner
Household Size

490
490

Number of Children

490

Head of Household

490

0.99
36.02 [35.04]
(0.42)
0.72
5.84 [5]
(0.10)
3.04 [3]
(0.07)
0.39

490
490
490
490
490

408
390

408

0.99
35.98 [35.22]
(0.45)
0.71
5.86 [5]
(0.11)
3.07 [3]
(0.08)
0.37

0.22
0.39
0.26
0.07
0.01

408
408
408
408
408

0.21
0.39
0.26
0.07
0.01

490
490
490
490

0.66
0.77
0.86
0.63

408
408
408
408

0.66
0.78
0.88
0.63

485
490
487
490
490
490
490
490
490

0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
10.87 [5]
9.31 [5]
10.11 [5]
8.71 [5]

405
408
406
408
408
408
408
408
408

0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.06
10.98 [5]
9.17 [5]
10.37 [5]
8.88 [5]

408
408
408

Panel B: Monthly Household Income
< GTQ500 (USD64)
GTQ501 - GTQ1,000 (USD64-USD128)
GTQ1,001 - GTQ2,000 (USD128-USD256)
GTQ2,001 - GTQ3,000 (USD256-USD384)
> Q3,001 (USD384)
Panel C: Financial Access Information
Never
Never
Never
Never

Had Savings Account
Had Checking Account
Used Credit Card
Applied for a Loan

Panel D: Liquidity and Changes to Liquidity
Any Formal Savings
Formal Savings > GTQ500 (USD64)
Any Informal Savings
Informal Savings > GTQ500 (USD64)
Any Savings Plan
Days Since Last Income (Self)
Days Since Last Income (Household)
Days Until Next Income (Self)
Days Until Next Income (Household)

Notes: Demographic characteristics are measured from self-reports in end-of-experiment survey. Our Analysis
Sample excludes 29 individuals who showed no variation in all 24 choices, 45 individuals who showed more than
4 non-monotonic choices that differed by more than one category, and 8 individuals who chose custom payment
plans.
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Table 1 also provides information on liquidity and recent changes in liquidity. More than 90%
of subjects have no formal or informal savings. This suggests limited savings to draw on to
smooth consumption. On the day of the study, subjects had received income on average around
10.9 days prior to the study and were expecting income to arrive in another 10.1 days. This
indicates that our experiment was not, on average, conducted at a time of particularly extreme
liquidity conditions.8

2.2

Measuring Time Preferences

We elicit time preferences using the modified CTB design introduced by Andreoni, Kuhn and
Sprenger (2015). In each experimental decision, subjects made an allocation to a sooner payment, xt , and a later payment, xt+k , at a given marginal rate of transformation. Specifically,
each allocation is required to satisfy the future value budget constraint

P xt + xt+k = M,

(1)

where M is the total budget to be allocated, and P captures the rate at which money delayed
from the sooner, t, to the later payment date, t + k, is transformed. The central difference
between the modified CTB design and the original CTB is that subjects’ allocation options
were restricted to a subset of six points along the budget rather than having a continuum of
available options. Participants were instructed to choose their most preferred option. Figure
1 contains a sample question, as it was presented to participants, with P = 1.25. Each option
specified the amount at time t, the amount at time t + k, and the total amount. Since many
participants had low levels of literacy and numeracy, we presented all choices in the CTB using
both numbers, and pictures of the associated quantities of money. The CTB followed the
procedure used in Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), for which amounts were denominated
in local currency (GTQ) and scaled up by a multiple of 5.9 Following Andreoni, Kuhn and
8

In subsection 3.3.3, we relate cross-sectional variation in liquidity to experimental behavior.
The average market exchange rate from February to March 2013 was GTQ7.82 per USD. According to
the World Development Indicators, 2013 international dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP$), using the
9

10
Sprenger (2015), we consider t ∈ {0, 35}, and k ∈ {36, 63}, for a total of four combinations of
t and t + k. For each of these combinations there were six budgets, each with a different value
of P . These parameters are summarized in Table B.1 of Appendix B.
As described in Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015), the inclusion of interior options,
in which a participant can receive a positive amount at both time t and time t + k, permits identification of diminishing marginal utility from variation in P . A person with more
rapidly diminishing marginal utility will exhibit less sensitivity to price, a smaller elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. Variation in delay length, k, permits identification of discounting,
and comparing behavior in cases where the sooner amount is delayed (i.e., t = 35) with cases
where it is not (i.e., t = 0) identifies present bias.10
conversion factor for private consumption was GTQ4.05 per PPP$.
10
To explore robustness, we also introduced three between-session variations in the CTB. First, for a given
combination of t and t + k, we varied the order in which participants saw the six budgets. In a given session,
the value of P was either monotonically increasing or decreasing across the six budgets associated with a given
t and t + k. Second, the options within a given budget were ordered such that the sooner amount was either
monotonically increasing or decreasing. Finally, the GTQ25 participation payment which was added to both
payments at time t and time t + k was explicitly shown in all CTB options in some sessions. This treatment
simply varies the salience of the participation fee, as this information was also given to all participants prior to
completing the tasks. The effects of these design features are quite limited and we discuss them primarily in
Appendix C.5 on robustness.

11

Figure 1: Sample question, as it was presented to participants, with P = 1.25.
In total, subjects made allocations in 24 CTB tasks. One task for each subject was chosen
at the end of the experiment. Participants additionally earned GTQ50 (about USD6.4) for participation in the experiment. Following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), half of this participation
fee was added to the sooner payment and half was added to the later payment of the randomly
selected budget from the CTB. This was intended to help equalize transaction costs between
options. Even if a participant was to allocate GTQ0 to a given date, she would still incur any
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transaction costs associated with receiving this minimum payment at that date. Participants
received two checks, each with the date that they could cash it, implied by t and t + k for the
randomly selected allocation.11

2.2.1

Identifying and Estimating Time Preferences

Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) discuss a number of methodologies for structurally estimating time preferences from CTB data. The method that they implement in their subsequent
prediction exercise for small-stakes laboratory and hypothetical decisions is based on simple
regression analysis.
Preferences over bundles (xt , xt+k ) are described by a time-separable, quasi-hyperbolically
discounted constant relative risk averse utility function,

U (xt , xt+k ) =




xα + βδ k xα

if t = 0



xαt + δ k xαt+k

if t > 0

t

t+k

.

(2)

The parameter δ is the exponential discount factor between periods, and β is the presentbias parameter, which is applied to the later payment in the case that the earlier payment is
realized in the present. The parameter, α, captures the degree of utility curvature, and hence,
determines diminishing marginal utility, and the preference for smoothness in intertemporal
payments.
Maximization of (2) under constraint (1) implies
xα−1
t
= P,
β t0 δ k xα−1
t+k
where t0 is an indicator for whether t = 0. Taking logs and rearranging, one arrives at the
11

For a few subjects, cashing bank checks did not follow the experimental protocol. Specifically, we have check
cashing data for 360 of the 408 subjects in our sample, and find that for 16.4% of participants, CTB checks
were cashed prior to their specified payment date. Such early cashing may be problematic if subjects forecasted
the ability to do so. Evidence suggests this is not the case as someone who forecasts this ability should simply
choose the maximal later payment value in each choice. There is no correlation between the amount allocated
to the later date in the CTB and early cashing (ρ = 0.0124, p = 0.814).
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linear form,

ln

xt
xt+k


=

ln(β)
ln(δ)
1
t0 +
k+
ln(P ).
α−1
α−1
α−1

(3)

Equation (3) makes clear the mapping from the variation of experimental parameters to structural parameter estimates alluded to above. Variation in P identifies the marginal utility
parameter, α − 1. For a fixed P , variation in delay length, k, identifies the discount factor, δ,
and variation in t0 identifies the present bias parameter, β.
Identifying α from the sensitivity of allocations to variation in prices highlights the connection between diminishing marginal utility and preferences for smoothness in consumption. A
person with rapidly diminishing marginal utility will be relatively insensitive to price changes,
and prefer smoother interior allocations to budget corners.
Estimation based on equation (3) requires formulation of an error structure. CTB applications generally impose an additive error structure, leaving equation (3) estimable with standard
techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS). Note, however, such an estimation strategy
ignores the discretized nature of the modified CTB data where (xt , xt+k ) takes one of six values for each allocation. Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) provide a number of additional
estimation strategies accounting for this discreteness, documenting broadly similar estimated
parameter values. We follow their approach, basing our predictions primarily on the simple
least squares estimator, and we evaluate alternative estimation strategies in Appendix C.3.
xt
), is not defined for corner solutions where xt = 0
Note that the log allocation ratio, ln( xt+k

or xt+k = 0. We adopt the convention of Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) and set these
corner solution values to GTQ0.001 for the purposes of estimation.
An additional issue related to the estimation of time preferences from experimental data is
background consumption. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008) and Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012) provide estimates of time preferences and marginal utility under assumptions
of fixed background consumption. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) also demonstrate a potential
sensitivity of curvature estimates with respect to varying assumptions of background consumption. If, for example, the background consumption is GTQ1,000 in equation (3), then the value

14
xt +1000
ln( xt+k
) will be relatively insensitive to variation in ln(P ), and α will be estimated close
+1000

to zero regardless of choice. Following equation (3), background consumption also influences
estimates of δ and β, with higher assumed background consumption leading to increases in both
δ and β. For our core analysis, we follow the convention (as much of the literature has done)
and assume zero background consumption.12 In Appendix C.3, we evaluate the sensitivity of
our results to changes in background consumption.
For behavior in our monetary discounting tasks to be informative of consumption preferences, subjects must have limited access to liquidity. An agent who can borrow (or save) at a
better rate than that implied by P should allocate her entire budget to the later (or sooner)
date. Behaviorally, one should observe only corner solutions and identify only the interval of
borrowing and lending rates, rather than any information about preferences. This point broadly
calls into question the use of monetary discounting tasks to identify consumption preferences
(Cubitt and Read, 2007; Chabris, Laibson and Schuldt, 2008a; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012).13
Table 1 demonstrates that our sample is likely to be liquidity constrained, being both poor and
with limited access to formal financial instruments. As such, one might expect our sample’s
behavior to be more reflective of their consumption preferences than college subject pools. Carvalho, Meier and Wang (2016) show plausible relationships between objective financial situation
and behavior in CTB tasks. In subsection 3.3.3 we link liquidity and financial access variables
to experimental behavior and find qualitatively similar results for groups where these potential
motives are more or less prevalent.

2.3

Large-Stakes Intertemporal Choice

Our experimental methodology identifies time preferences and marginal utility from CTB
choices with a future value of GTQ100. These stakes are substantial for our sample; they are
12
A background consumption parameter of zero is consistent with the literature on mental accounting, specifically related to narrow bracketing (Read, Loewenstein, Rabin, Keren and Laibson, 1999; Thaler, 1999).
13
On the other hand, Andreoni, Gravert, Kuhn, Saccardo and Yang (2018a) presents evidence that even under
favorable conditions (i.e., college students with access to instant bank transfers) choices in the CTB task are
far from the perfect arbitrage prediction.
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about two thirds of a monthly “Mi Bono Seguro” transfer. Our high-stakes decisions involve
twelve times that amount. Each participant was assigned a one-in-thirty chance of winning
GTQ1,200. This sum amounts to more than a month of household income for around 60% of
individuals in our sample.
After completing the CTB tasks, each participant was asked to specify how they would like
to receive these GTQ1,200 over a six month period, supposing that they won the draw. Six
payment plan choices were available to subjects, varying the timing of payments. All options
had the same date for the first payment, 7 to 20 days after the date of the experiment.14
Depending on the option chosen, subsequent payments would take place at fixed intervals after
the first payment. One payment plan option was to receive a single payment of GTQ1,200
on the 22nd or 8th of the month. The remaining payment plans provided opportunities to
smooth intertemporal payments with multiple payment options. Subjects could select two trimonthly payments of GTQ600, three bi-monthly payments of GTQ400, six monthly payments
of GTQ200, 12 bi-weekly payments of GTQ100, or customize a monthly payment schedule.
Figure 2 provides an example of the paradigm.15
Subjects did not know the outcome of the randomization for their CTB choices prior to
making payment plan decisions, and they were not informed of the upcoming plan decisions
when making CTB choices, limiting potential pollution across tasks. Furthermore, when payment plan options were being presented, subjects were informed that upon winning, they would
have to choose between receiving the payment from the CTB allocation (GTQ100) or from the
payment plan (GTQ1,200). This ensures that potential CTB payment dates would not affect
choices over payment plan options as subjects knew they would only be paid for one of the two.
14

The first payment date was set to either the 22nd or 8th of the current or next month, depending on the
date of the session, so as to leave at least one week and no more than three weeks between the session and the
first payment date.
15
In order to evaluate robustness of decisions to framing effects, in around half of the sessions, we varied
the order in which these options were presented (either increasing or decreasing the number of payments).
Behavioral differences are evaluated in Appendix C.5.

16
HOJA DE RESPUSTAS
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DECISIÓN 1
6

7

8

9

10

1. Sesión

4

11

12

13

14

15

16

5
17

6
18

7

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

0 0

1

2. Participante #
19
3. Encuestador

1

24
6

25

26
7

27
8

28
9

1

1
2.1b

10

Opción 1
TOTAL: Q1,200

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

¿Cuánto?

Opción 2
TOTAL: Q1,200

Opción 3
TOTAL: Q1,200

Opción 4
TOTAL: Q1,200

Opción 5
TOTAL: Q1,200

Opción 6
TOTAL: Q1,200

Figure 2: Example of a question about large-stakes intertemporal choice

2.4

Session Protocols

As participants arrived, they were asked to provide (oral) informed consent and were registered
before the start of the session. Each session was conducted by a session leader who had a team
of assistants. After welcoming the participants, the session leader gave a presentation of the
instructions, which was projected in the room. The text of these instructions, translated from
the original Spanish, can be found in Appendix D.
Due to participants’ low levels of formal education and literacy, we provided individual sup-
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port to each participant throughout the session. In particular, assistants asked each participant
the questions for each experimental task individually, resolved any questions as they arose, and
recorded the participants’ decisions. In addition, we presented each choice in the experimental
tasks with visual aids and the presentation was intended to increase understanding.
Once participants had finished all the experimental tasks, they completed, again with the
help of an assistant, a socio-demographic survey. Their answers in this survey were not incentivized. While the surveys were administered, participants received a snack, and something to
drink.
Each session lasted between three and four hours. A total of 23 sessions were run. In each
of these sessions, between 15 and 24 participants were present. Sessions were conducted during
February and March of 2013, and were run in 12 municipalities across 4 counties.
All 490 subjects who were initially selected for the experiment completed both the CTB
tasks and their large-stakes payment plan choice. Among the CTB decisions, twenty-nine (5.9%)
subjects exhibited no variation in experimental response across all 24 tasks. Additionally 45
subjects (9.8%) exhibited substantial non-monotonicities in demand, increasing their allocation
to the sooner payment date by more than one position as P increased 4 or more times in 20
opportunities.16 These subjects are all removed from the analysis. Among the large-stakes
payment plan choice, 8 (1.74%) chose to customize their payment plan. For ease of explication,
we ignore this small sub-sample as well. Our final sample of subjects for analysis is 408 subjects.
Table 1 shows separate demographic characteristics for the full sample and the analysis sample
showing limited demographic differences.
16

A more extreme measure that may be more familiar to readers, is switching from allocating the entire
budget to the later payment to allocating the entire budget to the sooner payment, as P increases. Sixty-seven
subjects (14.5%) exhibited such extreme non-monotonicity, at least once. This figure compares favorably to the
similar behavior of multiple switching in standard price list experiments (see, e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; Meier
and Sprenger, 2010). In Figure B.1 of Appendix B, we present histograms from the frequency of monotonicity
violations across subjects, demonstrating that most of our analysis sample respects monotonicity at high rates.
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3

Results

We present the results in three broad sections. In the first subsection, we analyze the reducedform relationship between choice over structured payment plans and experimental responses.
In the second subsection, we present structural analysis linking intertemporal preference parameters to plan choice at both the aggregate and individual levels. In the third subsection,
we present robustness tests and additional analyses.

3.1

Reduced-Form Results

Table 2 presents plan choices for the 408 subjects in our analysis sample. Ninety subjects
(22%) opted for the single payment plan of GTQ1,200 and 318 subjects (78%) chose one of the
smooth payment plans. Among smooth payment plans, a similar proportion of subjects chose
two, three, and six payment plans, with only a small minority of subjects opting for twelve
bi-weekly payments of GTQ100. Table 2 also provides summaries of experimental choices in
the CTB design. We calculate the proportion of allocations that are impatient (the entire
budget is allocated to the sooner date), patient (the entire budget is allocated to the later
date), and interior. Forty-six percent of allocations are interior allocations, and only 34 of 408
subjects (8.4%) made zero interior allocations in 24 opportunities. These choice patterns differ
qualitatively from CTB experiments in college subject pools. For example, with UCSD undergraduates Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) report 12% interior allocations with 60% of
subjects making zero interior allocations in 24 opportunities.17 With non-diminishing marginal
utility, one would expect only corner solutions in our CTBs, where the entire budget is allocated to either the sooner or later payment depending on the rate of interest. Similarly, with
non-diminishing marginal utility, one would expect a preference for the single payment plan
among the payment plan options. Observed choices in both settings suggest an important role
for diminishing marginal utility; a preference for smoothing intertemporal payments is observed
17

In developing country sample, interior allocations appear more frequent. Kramer, Janssens and Swart (2013)
and Giné, Goldberg, Silverman and Yang (2012) document in the range of 45% and 69% interior allocations.
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in both CTB and payment plan choice.

Table 2: Payment Plan Choice and CTB Response
Payment Plan Choice

CTB Choice
# Observations (% of Total) Impatient Interior Patient

Chose Single Payment Plan (GTQ1,200)

90 (22%)

0.22

0.41

0.37

Chose Any Smooth Payment Plan
Two Payments (GTQ600)
Three Payments (GTQ400)
Six Payments (GTQ200)
Twelve Payments (GTQ100)

318
111
84
87
36

(78%)
(27%)
(21%)
(21%)
(9%)

0.13
0.13
0.14
0.11
0.14

0.47
0.38
0.48
0.56
0.52

0.39
0.48
0.37
0.33
0.33

Total

408 (100%)

0.15

0.46

0.39

Notes: Plan choice for 408 participants and Convex Time Budget (CTB) Choice. Impatient (Patient) choice reflects subject
allocating entire budget to sooner (later) payment.

Table 2 provides separate calculations for the proportion of impatient, interior, and patient
CTB behavior for each subgroup of payment plan choice. Interestingly, raw behavior seems
to differ by plan choice. Subjects who chose the single payment option make around 9%-age
points (70%) more impatient choices and 6%-age points (13%) fewer interior allocations than
subjects who chose smooth payment plans.18 These patterns carry a natural intuition. Greater
patience and more rapidly diminishing marginal utility, as conveyed by more interior and more
patient allocations, are linked to choosing smooth payment plans.
Figure 3 and Table 3 analyze the relationship between plan choice and experimental behavior
18

Among subjects choosing smooth payment plans further differences are observed, with a high number of
payments correlating with a greater proportion of interior choices and a lesser proportion of patience choices.
Among smooth payment plan subjects, the raw correlation between the number of interior and impatient choices
a subject made (out of 24) and the number of payments in the structured payment plan is ρ = 0.16 (p < 0.01)
and ρ = −0.15 (p < 0.01), respectively. We provide further discussion of this variation across groups in Appendix
C.2.

20

Panel A: Allocations
k=63 days

60
40
20
0

Allocation to Sooner Payment

80

k=35 days

1

1.25

1.5

1.75

2

2.25

1

1.25

1.5

1.75

2

2.25

Rate of Transformation (P)
Chose Single

Chose Smooth

+/- 1 s.e.

Panel B: Impatient and Interior Choice
k=63 days

.4
.2
0

Proportion

.6

k=35 days

1

1.25

1.5

1.75

2

2.25

1

1.25

1.5

1.75

2

2.25

Rate of Transformation (P)
Interior Chose Single

Impatient Chose Single

Interior Chose Smooth

Impatient Chose Smooth

Figure 3: Allocation to the sooner payment date; proportion of impatient and interior choices.
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Table 3: Plan Choice and Experimental Behavior
Dependent Variable:
Chose Smooth Payment Plan
Rate of Transformation: P
Delay Length: k
Immediate Choice: t0
Chose Smooth × P
Chose Smooth × k
Chose Smooth × t0
Constant
R-Squared
# Observations
# Clusters

Sooner Allocation
(1)
(2)

Impatient Choice
(3)
(4)

Interior Choice
(5)
(6)

-6.198*** -17.903*** -0.089*** -0.200*** 0.068**
0.076
(2.197)
(4.904)
(0.025)
(0.061)
(0.034)
(0.076)
-33.492*** -42.215*** -0.176*** -0.291*** -0.059***
0.024
(1.096)
(2.484)
(0.013)
(0.031)
(0.014)
(0.031)
0.317***
0.395***
0.003*** 0.004***
0.001
-0.001
(0.027)
(0.068)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
-3.575*** -5.913***
-0.015
-0.022
-0.047*** -0.095***
(0.806)
(1.998)
(0.009)
(0.025)
(0.013)
(0.029)
11.189***
0.147***
-0.107***
(2.751)
(0.034)
(0.034)
-0.100
-0.002**
0.002*
(0.074)
(0.001)
(0.001)
2.998
0.009
0.061*
(2.177)
(0.027)
(0.033)
65.286*** 74.412*** 0.341*** 0.427*** 0.480*** 0.474***
(2.684)
(4.276)
(0.031)
(0.057)
(0.040)
(0.068)
0.152
9789
408

0.155
9789
408

0.048
9789
408

0.052
9789
408

0.007
9789
408

0.009
9789
408

Notes: Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are presented with standard errors that are clustered on individual level.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

in closer detail. In Panel A of Figure 3, we present the average allocation to the sooner
payment date for each value of P for the two delay lengths, k = 35 and k = 63 days.19
At each interest rate, subjects opting for smooth payment plans allocate less money to the
sooner payment. Additionally, subjects opting for smooth payment plans are less sensitive to
variation in P . Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 provide corresponding statistics. Controlling for
the experimental parameters, P , k and t0 , subjects who chose smooth payment plans allocate
around GTQ6 less to the sooner payment and are around 20% less sensitive to variation in
P than those who chose single payment plans. Panel B of Figure 3 and columns (3) through
(6) of Table 3 provide detail on the proportion of impatient and interior choices. Controlling
for experimental parameters, subjects who chose smooth payment plans make significantly
19

For the purposes of the graphic, data from observations with t0 equal to one and equal to zero are averaged
together.
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fewer impatient choices and significantly more interior choices than those who chose the single
payment plan.

3.2

Structural Results

The results of the prior subsection show important reduced-form linkages between payment plan
choice and CTB response. Our structural exercise interprets CTB behavior through the lens
of a discounted utility model. Table 4 provides aggregate estimates of α, δ, and β following
equation (3) estimated via OLS. For ease of explication, we discuss estimates of a monthly
discount factor, δ 30 . In column (1) of Table 4, we estimate a curvature parameter of α = 0.887
(clustered s.e. = 0.005), a monthly discount factor of δ 30 = 0.983 (0.018), and a present bias
parameter of β = 1.164 (0.028).
Relative to prior CTB studies with college samples, our value of α indicates substantially
more concavity of utility. This parameter is informed by the preponderance of interior allocations and the corresponding lack of price sensitivity in our sample. For example, Andreoni,
Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) estimate α = 0.947 in a sample of college subjects, where only 12%
of allocations are interior and 60% of subjects make zero interior allocations.20 Our estimate
of α suggests a greater degree of diminishing marginal utility, with the 1,200th quetzal (above
0) being worth around 75% of the 100th quetzal.21
Our aggregate estimate of the monthly discount factor implies that utility is discounted by
around 1.7% per month, which lies within the range of prior estimates (Frederick, Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue, 2002). In contrast, our estimate of β = 1.17 suggests aggregate future bias;
an infrequent finding in the literature, which has generally found near time consistency or
slight present bias in monetary CTB studies (e.g., Imai, Rutter and Camerer, 2019; Sawada
and Kuroishi, 2015; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger, 2015).
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 provide separate structural estimates of utility parameters
20

Our results are closer to the estimates of Sawada and Kuroishi (2015). Using an adaptation of the CTB in
the Philippines, those authors report α between 0.74 and 0.85 (depending on the estimation method).
21
Calculated as 12000.887−1 /1000.887−1 = 0.755.
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Table 4: Aggregate Parameter Estimates
(1)
Analysis Sample

(2)
(3)
Chose Single Plan Chose Smooth Plan

Curvature: α

0.887
(0.005)

0.911
(0.007)

0.878
(0.007)

Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30

0.983
(0.018)

0.893
(0.029)

1.020
(0.023)

Present Bias: β

1.164
(0.028)

1.177
(0.056)

1.159
(0.032)

1.166
(0.059)

0.900
(0.064)

1.306
(0.085)

9,789
408

2,158
90

7,631
318

Plan Value Ratio (PVR):
Average Smooth Value/Single Value
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth

H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth

χ2 (1) = 12.22
(p < 0.001)
χ2 (1) = 12.12
(p < 0.001)
χ2 (1) = 0.08
(p = 0.781)
χ2 (1) = 14.48
(p < 0.001)

Notes: Estimates are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (3) with standard errors that are
clustered on individual level. Relative value of average smooth payment to single payment plan are calculated from
non-linear combinations of regression coefficients. The standard errors reported in parentheses are calculated using the
delta method. Null hypotheses tested after regression of equation (3) with interactions for plan choice with k, t0 and
ln(P ), with standard errors clustered at individual level.
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for subjects who chose single and smooth payment plans. Echoing the raw data, subjects
who chose smooth payment plans are estimated to have lower values of α and higher values
of δ, while estimates of β are indistinguishable across groups. The null hypotheses of equal
curvature and monthly discount factors across single and smooth payment groups are rejected
at all conventional levels, χ2 (1) = 12.2 (p < 0.01) and χ2 (1) = 12.1 (p < 0.01), respectively.
Individuals who chose smooth payment plans are estimated to have higher degrees of diminishing marginal utility and patience. These characteristics deliver a desire to smooth intertemporally, and a willingness to wait for later payments, which should make smooth payment plans
more valuable. In order to provide estimates of relative plan values, we calculate each plan’s
discounted valuation with the estimated parameters, α and δ.22 That is, for plan j, we calculate
its discounted value as
Vj =

" l
X

#1/α
δ k−s xαt+k;j

,

k=s

where xt+k;j is the payment prescribed by plan j at date t + k, s is the soonest date a payment
is available (7 to 20 days from the experiment date), and l is the last payment date (around 180
days). This normalizes the discounted value of the single payment plan to the exact amount of
1/α

GTQ1,200. Similarly, the two-payment plan value is V2 = [600α + δ 90 600α ]
payment plan value is V3 = [400α + δ 60 400α + δ 120 400α ]

1/α

, and the three-

. To have a convenient summary for

the relative value of single and smooth payment plans we construct a summary measure, the
Plan Value Ratio (PVR), the average value of all smooth plans divided by the value of the
single plan,
1
4

P

j∈{2,3,6,12}

V1

Vj

.

Table 4 provides estimates of PVRs with standard errors calculated via the delta method. Based
upon the aggregate estimates of column (1) smooth plans should have an average discounted
value around 17% higher than the single payment plan. Plan value estimates differ importantly
by plan choice. Individuals who chose the single payment plan are predicted to value it most
22

Differences in plan values are informed by α and δ. Because present bias alters only the level of all plan
values, it has no effect on the relative value of smooth versus single payment plans.
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highly, and value smooth payment plans around 10% less on average than the single payment
plan. In contrast, individuals who chose smooth payments are predicted to value smooth
payment plans around 30% more on average than the single payment plan. The difference in
PVRs between individuals who chose smooth or single plans is significant at all conventional
levels, χ2 (1) = 14.5 (p < 0.01).

3.2.1

Individual Structural Analyses

Our aggregate findings point to important differences in estimated preference parameters between individuals who chose the single payment plan and those who chose smooth payments
plans. Aggregate structural utility estimates are closely consistent the differential choice of
payment plans across groups: individuals who chose smooth (or single) plans are estimated
to value them more highly. This broad correlation between estimated preferences and large
stakes choice for these two groups may mask important individual-level heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in discounting parameters is widely acknowledged, with even homogeneous samples
showing substantial variation (see e.g., Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002; Ashraf, Karlan and
Yin, 2006; Meier and Sprenger, 2015). CTB choices and the structural equation (3) allow for
individual estimates of utility parameters. We estimate (3) via non-linear least squares restricting 0 < α < 1. Individual parameters and contract values are estimable for 343 of 408 (84%)
subjects in the analysis sample.23
Table 5 provides individual parameter estimates and contract values for each group of
subjects. For the entire sample, the median [25th-75th %-ile] estimate of α is 0.89 [0.81-0.94],
while the median [25th-75th %-ile] estimate of δ 30 is 0.95 [0.81-1.26]. Echoing the aggregate
PVR predictions, the average smooth payment plan is valued around 11% more than the single
payment plan.24 For each individual, we also construct the measure 1Smooth>Single , an indicator
23

The nonlinear least squares procedure with the box constraint for α was chosen as some individual ordinary
least squares estimates yielded values of α outside of these bounds. For the 65 excluded individuals, our
estimator fails to recover at least one parameter value leaving an estimated covariance matrix of non-full rank.
We base our restriction of the sample on this full rank covariance matrix characteristic.
24
Because some estimates of plan values are extreme, we topcode the individual PVR variable at 5.
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for whether any smooth payment plan has a higher estimated value than the single payment
plan. Overall 59% of subjects are estimated to value some smooth payment plan more than
the single payment plan.
Table 5: Plan Choice and Individual Structural Estimates
Payment Plan Choice

Structural Estimates
# Obs
α
δ 30
β
PVR
1Smooth>Single
(% of Total) 50 [25-75] %-ile 50 [25-75] %-ile 50 [25-75] %-ile 50 [25-75] %-ile

Chose Single (GTQ1,200)

80 (23%)

0.92 [0.86,0.95]

0.86 [0.76,1.20]

1.19 [0.90,1.59]

0.79 [0.64,1.84]

0.43

Chose Any Smooth Payment Plan
Two Payments (GTQ600)
Three Payments (GTQ400)
Six Payments (GTQ200)
Twelve Payments (GTQ100)

263 (77%)
95 (28%)
69 (20%)
68 (20%)
31 (9%)

0.88
0.90
0.88
0.87
0.87

0.98
1.06
0.97
0.94
0.89

1.16
1.16
1.14
1.19
1.12

1.21
1.40
1.26
1.07
1.03

[0.80,3.20]
[0.85,2.85]
[0.80,4.35]
[0.77,5.00]
[0.78,2.21]

0.65
0.69
0.65
0.62
0.55

All

343 (100%)

0.89 [0.81,0.94]

1.11 [0.75,2.82]

0.59

[0.80,0.93]
[0.84,0.93]
[0.81,0.93]
[0.74,0.94]
[0.72,0.92]

[0.82,1.29]
[0.85,1.29]
[0.82,1.28]
[0.83,1.35]
[0.80,1.21]

0.95 [0.81,1.26]

[0.91,1.52]
[0.88,1.40]
[0.92,1.58]
[0.95,1.54]
[0.87,1.94]

1.16 [0.91,1.53]

Notes: Plan choice for 343 of 408 participants with estimable individual preferences for α, δ, and β. PVR represents estimated individual average value of smooth
payment contracts relative to the single payment contract. 1Smooth>Single represents an indicator for any smooth payment plan has a higher estimated value than
the single payment plan.

Differences between subgroups are readily apparent in Table 5. Individuals who chose the
single payment plan have generally higher values of α and lower values of δ than those who
chose smooth payment plans. Individual estimates of plan values indicate that 57% of single
payment plan choosers should value the single payment plan more than any smooth payment
plan, while 65% of smooth payment plan choosers should value a smooth payment plan more
than the single payment plan (Fisher’s Exact Test, (p < 0.01)). At the plan value level, Table 5
also demonstrates sharp distributional differences in PVRs between smooth and single payment
plan choosers (Mann–Whitney test, z = 3.44, (p < 0.01)).
Table 5 demonstrates statistical differences between single payment and smooth payment
plan choosers in both plan values and predicted choice. A different question is the distinction
between predicted and random choice. Under random choice over the five payment plans,
one would expect 20 percent of subjects to choose any option. Overall, this would lead to 80
percent of subjects choosing smooth payments plans, and 20 percent of subjects choosing the
single payment plan. If true choice were random and independent of individual preferences,
these proportions would hold regardless of our predicted choice, 1Smooth>Single . We predict

1Smooth>Single = 0 for 139 subjects (41 percent of our sample). Of those 139 subjects, 33.1
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percent actually chose the single payment plan, substantially better than the chance value of
20 percent (p < 0.001 for one-tailed test). We predict 1Smooth>Single = 1 for 204 subjects (59
percent of our sample). Of those 204 subjects, 83.3 percent actually chose a smooth payment
plan, slightly better than the chance value of 80 percent (p = 0.117 for one-tailed test).
Our analysis shows clear individual differences in estimated preference parameters and plan
values that correspond closely with plan choices. Echoing the aggregate results, those individuals that make more patient and interior CTB choices — consistent with having more rapidly
diminishing marginal utility and a higher degree of patience — prefer smooth payment plans.
The preference for smoothness and willingness to wait revealed from CTB choice is closely
reflected in large stakes choices over payment plans.

3.3

Robustness Tests and Additional Exercises

The results presented thus far show reduced-form and structural differences in elicited time
preferences between individuals who chose single and smooth large-stakes payment plans. Estimates of patience and marginal utility from experimental procedures are importantly predictive
of large-stakes plan choice. Here, we conduct a number of additional analyses to ensure the
robustness of these results.

3.3.1

Individual Measurement Error

Our aggregate and individual exercises show clear differences in CTB responses and estimated
preferences between individuals who chose single and smooth payment plans. For our aggregate
exercise, the analysis is based on a statistical comparison of behavior and estimated parameters
across the two groups. As such, the standard errors of the relevant estimates are a constituent
part of the hypothesis testing for equal estimates provided in Tables 3 and 4. In contrast, the
distinction in individual PVR values highlighted in section 3.2.1 does not take into account
errors in the individual estimates. In Appendix C.1, we account for these errors and the
relationship between them explicitly by drawing 1,000 simulants for each subject from the
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multivariate normal distribution established by their individual estimates. We then calculate
plan values and the proportion of simulants who carry higher valuations for smooth plans
relative to the single plan. Accounting for this measurement error does not change the core
message established in section 3.2.1, that individual estimates correlate significantly with plan
choice. See Appendix C.1 for detail.

3.3.2

Alternative Rationales for Interior Allocations

We have interpreted interior CTB allocations as evidence of diminishing marginal utility and
linked this evidence with a subsequent choice to smooth large-stakes intertemporal payments.
There exist several other potential rationales for making interior allocations in the CTB.
First, a number of authors have argued that confusion and miscomprehension may drive
interior allocations in the CTB (Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2012; Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao,
Huang and Wakker, 2016; Chakraborty, Calford, Fenig and Halevy, 2017).25 Our data show
that not only interior allocations, but also more patient allocations correlate with subsequent
plan choice. For such patterns to arise through a common force of confusion, and for the
corresponding utility estimates to match the structured payment plan choices seems unlikely.
Nonetheless, if non-monotonic choices are taken as evidence of confusion, we can examine only
subjects who exhibit few non-monotonicities in choice. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, we
provide separate analysis for subjects with one or fewer non-monotonicities and those with more
than one non-monotonicity. In both sub-samples, we find differences in patience, curvature and
payment plan values.26
Second, interior allocations may be driven by an alternative motive besides diminishing
marginal utility. For example, our sample is effectively all women, who may wish to hide
25

See Appendix A for further discussion of these points.
As evidenced by the notably different levels of curvatures across the subgroups of columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6, the total number of interior allocations and the total number of non-monotonicities with respect to
P are correlated. For individuals with no interior allocations to exhibit non-monotonicities, they must switch
from allocating the entire budget to the sooner payment to the entire budget to the later payment and then
back again. That is, non-monotonicities require less extreme behavioral changes to identify when subjects make
interior choices.
26
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funds from their husband or significant other. Although it is not clear a desire to hide funds
would necessarily lead to interior allocations, it may be that women expect any money coming
into the household to be spent too quickly. Smoothing allocations in the CTB could ensure
that at least some funds remain at later dates. A similar motivation could lead to a desire
for smooth payment plans. To investigate this hypothesis, we provide separate estimates for
women who either report being the head of the household or report not being the head (columns
(3) and (4) of Table 6), and for women who report being married or with a partner, and those
women who do not report this (columns (5) and (6) of Table 6). Table 6 reports these estimates,
which show little difference in estimated preferences or plan values across household-head status
and married/partnered status, suggesting that this motivation is not driving interior choices.
Further, PVR values continue to differ for those who chose single and smooth plans along the
lines previously documented for all subgroups considered.
Third, similar to the overconsumption of another household member, one could imagine
forecasting own overconsumption out of experimental payments due to present bias. Individuals could smooth both their CTB allocations and their structured payment plans in order to
ensure available funds through time. Although PVRs should, in principle, not depend on the
present bias parameter, β, such a motive could lead smooth payment plans to be more desirable for present-biased (and sophisticated) agents. We see no indication of such a motive. The
parameter β is statistically indistinguishable across individuals who chose smooth and single
payment plans in our core specifications and those presented here.

3.3.3

Liquidity and Arbitrage

As documented in Table 1, our low-income sample has arguably limited access to liquidity, with
roughly 90% having no formal savings and 80% having never used a credit card. Although this
suggests few natural opportunities to arbitrage the experiment, one can further examine the
potential forces of arbitrage in the data.
First, if subjects were arbitraging our experiments, we should likely see two broad patterns:
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Table 6: Aggregate Parameter Estimates by Alternative Rationales for Interior Allocations
6 1 Non-Monotonicities
No
Yes

Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR)
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)

Head of Household
No
Yes

Married
No

Yes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.934
(0.006)
0.914
(0.006)

0.881
(0.013)
0.838
(0.013)

0.914
(0.008)
0.886
(0.007)

0.904
(0.014)
0.860
(0.014)

0.896
(0.020)
0.862
(0.016)

0.920
(0.014)
0.835
(0.032)

0.893
(0.040)
1.056
(0.036)

0.892
(0.041)
0.981
(0.028)

0.885
(0.034)
0.972
(0.023)

0.911
(0.054)
1.125
(0.054)

0.874
(0.065)
1.081
(0.056)

0.986
(0.081)
1.096
(0.095)

1.222
(0.076)
1.193
(0.043)

1.120
(0.084)
1.121
(0.046)

1.159
(0.067)
1.162
(0.035)

1.218
(0.103)
1.152
(0.064)

1.111
(0.124)
1.149
(0.073)

1.330
(0.117)
1.202
(0.105)

0.870
(0.081)
1.328
(0.129)

0.961
(0.194)
1.129
(0.163)

0.880
(0.072)
1.136
(0.072)

0.949
(0.133)
1.795
(0.301)

0.882
(0.150)
1.588
(0.271)

0.905
(0.070)
1.222
(0.083)

3,742
156

6,047
252

6,190
258

3,599
150

2,807
117

6,982
291

1.84
(p = 0.18)
5.54
(p = 0.19)
0.07
(p = 0.79)
5.21
(p < 0.05)

9.89
(p < 0.01)
6.21
(p < 0.05)
0.21
(p = 0.65)
8.56
(p < 0.01)

5.91
(p < 0.05)
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChseSmooth
; χ2 (1)
9.01
(p < 0.01)
H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
0.11
(p = 0.74)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
9.06
(p < 0.01)

5.54
(p < 0.05)
3.07
(p < 0.10)
0.00
(p = 0.99)
5.02
(p < 0.05)

6.87
4.90
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.05)
4.29
7.77
(p < 0.05) (p < 0.01)
0.00
0.30
(p = 0.96) (p = 0.58)
6.29
6.59
(p < 0.05) (p < 0.05)

Notes: Estimates are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (3) with standard errors that are clustered on individual
level. Utility estimates and plan values are calculated from non-linear combinations of regression coefficients. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are calculated using the delta method. Null hypotheses tested after regression of equation (3) with interactions for plan choice with
k, t0 and ln(P ), with standard errors clustered at individual level.
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only corner solutions in the CTB as subjects create for themselves a set of opportunities that
dominate those offered in the experiment; and only choices of the single payment plan of
GTQ1,200 as subjects can find opportunities that bear positive interest over time. Neither of
these are observed with 46% of the CTB data being at budget interiors and 78% of subjects
choosing smooth large-stakes payment plans.
Second, if only some subjects were arbitraging we should see different correlational patterns
than those observed. Arbitraging subjects should be more patient than non-arbitraging subjects
as they would take advantage of the high experimental values of P by allocating the entire
budget to the later payment date. If such arbitraging subjects also arbitrage the single payment
plan, the researcher would observe more patient, rather than less patient, subjects choosing the
single payment. The observed correlation between discounting and plan choice is not consistent
with arbitrage.
We also examine the empirical relationship between financial access, liquidity, and experimental behavior. In Table 7, we provide separate estimates of CTB-elicited preferences by
access to savings, whether or not an individual has ever used a credit card, and whether or
not someone has been paid relatively recently (i.e., splitting at the median time of five days).
These estimates show no changes to our core conclusions based on differential access to liquidity. Taken together, these arguments suggest that subjects do indeed use both the CTB and
the structured payment plans to smooth consumption over time.

3.3.4

Transaction Costs and Plan Choice

While our CTB paradigm focuses on equalizing transaction costs for sooner and later payments
in order to provide credible preference estimates, transaction costs may differ at the different
payment dates of our large-stakes payment plans. Individuals may avoid certain plans to avoid
the requirement of receiving and cashing checks on multiple dates. Such additional transaction
costs are not modeled in our assessment of plan values and, hence, are not represented in
PVRs. In Appendix C.2, we simulate behavior with a fixed transaction cost per payment.
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Table 7: Aggregate Parameter Estimates by Liquidity
Any Savings
No
Yes

Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR):
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)

Ever Used Credit Card Low Current Liquidity
No
Yes
No
Yes

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.912
(0.008)
0.875
(0.007)

0.907
(0.015)
0.891
(0.015)

0.914
(0.007)
0.877
(0.007)

0.879
(0.028)
0.884
(0.018)

0.920
(0.008)
0.890
(0.008)

0.898
(0.013)
0.862
(0.011)

0.888
(0.031)
1.029
(0.025)

0.918
(0.082)
0.973
(0.052)

0.898
(0.028)
1.011
(0.024)

0.848
(0.133)
1.085
(0.061)

0.849
(0.033)
0.977
(0.027)

0.957
(0.052)
1.075
(0.039)

1.180
(0.062)
1.146
(0.034)

1.157
(0.130)
1.228
(0.085)

1.178
(0.056)
1.166
(0.035)

1.161
(0.254)
1.109
(0.071)

1.187
(0.077)
1.203
(0.043)

1.162
(0.080)
1.105
(0.047)

0.890
(0.067)
1.345
(0.098)

0.961
(0.194)
1.129
(0.163)

0.906
(0.063)
1.278
(0.089)

0.853
(0.277)
1.520
(0.284)

0.804
(0.061)
1.143
(0.083)

1.072
(0.147)
1.563
(0.187)

8,349
348

1,440
60

8,589
358

1,200
50

4,918
205

4,871
203

0.03
(p = 0.86)
2.21
(p = 0.14)
0.04
(p = 0.85)
2.82
(p < 0.10)

7.52
(p < 0.01)
8.97
(p < 0.01)
0.03
(p = 0.85)
10.76
(p < 0.01)

4.51
(p < 0.05)
3.18
(p = 0.07)
0.37
(p = 0.54)
4.25
(p < 0.05)

11.94
0.58
14.52
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.45) (p < 0.01)
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth
; χ2 (1)
12.24
0.31
9.02
(p < 0.01) (p = 0.58) (p < 0.01)
H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
0.23
0.21
0.04
(p = 0.63) (p = 0.65) (p = 0.85)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
14.66
0.44
11.59
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.51) (p < 0.01)

Notes: Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regression of equation (3) with standard errors that are clustered on individual level. Utility
estimates and plan values are calculated from non-linear combinations of regression coefficients. The standard errors reported in parentheses are
calculated using the delta method. Null hypotheses tested after regression of equation (3) with interactions for plan choice with k, t0 and ln(P ),
with standard errors clustered at individual level.
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Two findings result from this exercise. First, accounting for transaction costs, PVRs continue
to differ notably between individuals who chose smooth and single payment plans. Second,
without transaction costs there should be a stark preference for either the single plan or the
most smooth plan, 12 payments of GTQ100. With moderate transaction costs (random with
mean GTQ15 and standard deviation 10), the intermediate plans with 2, 3, and 6 payments
are more frequently chosen.

3.3.5

Additional Robustness Tests and Analyses.

In Appendices C.3-C.5, we undertake a number of additional exercises. In Appendix C.3, we
explore alternate estimation strategies for preferences. Following Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger
(2015), we provide estimates that are based on the solution function for the sooner allocation
in the CTB, rather than the linearized Euler equation. Within this framework, we also provide
estimates under different assumptions for background consumption. The qualitative conclusion
on differing preference estimates for those who chose single and smooth plans is unaffected by
these differing estimation techniques and assumptions. Appendix C.3 provides further discussion of Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods for estimating preferences on CTB data.
Appendix C.4 discusses alternate potential sources of information on marginal utility. Our
exercise identifies marginal utility from a desire to smooth intertemporal CTB payments. Alternate procedures to the CTB either identify marginal utility from risky choice tasks or leave
it unmeasured. We impose values of utility curvature generally found in risky choice tasks
and find broad mispredictions for payment plan choice. Given the substantial risk aversion
generally found in experimental risk tasks, smooth plans should be valued much more highly
than the single plan by all subjects. Additionally, without information on utility, differences in
discounting alone yield less predictive power.
In Appendix C.5, we focus attention on a number of cross-randomized features of our CTB
presentation. Between subjects, we randomly varied three features of the presentation to assure
robustness of our core findings. First, we altered whether CTB budgets were presented with the
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all-later allocation at the top of the task (as in Figure 1) or at the bottom of the task. Second,
we altered whether consecutive budgets were presented in increasing or decreasing order of
P . Third, we altered whether the CTB payment entries included or excluded the subjects’
participation payment. Though some presentation effects are documented, our broad finding
of different preference estimates and plan values for individuals who chose single and smooth
payment plans remains.

4

Discussion and Conclusion

This project seeks to explore the predictive content of experimental measures of time preferences
for large-stakes financial decisions. In a sample of CCT recipients in Guatemala, we elicit time
preferences using a CTB technique, which allows for estimates of both discounting parameters
and marginal utility. We examine large-stakes choices of these same subjects, who are asked
how they would like to smooth the payment of around 10% of annual income over a six month
period in one of six payment plans. We ask whether CTB parameter estimates meaningfully
predict plan choice.
We show that experimental behavior and estimates of discounting and marginal utility from
experimental parameters closely predict subsequent plan choice. Subjects that chose to smooth
experimental payments over time in the CTB, which corresponds to more rapidly diminishing
marginal utility, were more likely to choose smooth payment plans. Similarly, subjects that
made more patient choices in the CTB, which corresponds to higher discount factor estimates,
were also more likely to choose smooth payment plans with later payments. These features of
experimental and plan choice are internally consistent. Subjects who ultimately chose smooth
(single) plans are estimated to prefer such plans based upon their experimental choice.
The identification of time preferences from experimental data remains a topic of debate with
a number of viewpoints arguing for and against specific methodologies. We hope this work helpfully adds to this discussion. In a sample of low-income, low-literacy and liquidity-constrained
subjects, we show that experimentally elicited preferences do what they are supposed to do:
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predict large-stakes behavior out-of-sample. These findings solidify the foundation of experimental research that simultaneously identifies marginal utility and impatience.
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A

Discussion of Utility Curvature and Experimental
Procedures

In response to the criticism of Frederick et al. (2002) on the confounding effects of diminishing marginal utility for making inference on patience, new experimental methods have been
developed. Some aim to identify patience alone without curvature using either probabilistic
payments or streams of common payments (Anderhub, Guth, Gneezy and Sonsino, 2001; Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao, Huang and Wakker, 2016).27 Other methods aim to identify diminishing
marginal utility alongside discounting parameters, either by identifying curvature from independent risk tasks (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2008), or by convexifying the time
budget (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012).
These last two methods that aim to identify diminishing marginal utility have lead to
results that differ widely. With concavity informed by risky choice tasks, Andersen, Harrison,
Lau and Rutstrom (2008) find rapidly diminishing marginal utility. With concavity informed
by subjects choosing to spread intertemporal payments over time in their CTB task, Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012) find only modestly diminishing marginal utility measures. Andreoni et al.
(2015) reproduce these differences in a single college subject pool. College subjects are both
strikingly risk averse in small-stakes risk tasks and do not express a strong desire to smooth
their experimental payments through time.
As a result of these differences, a debate has developed on the importance of and the most
appropriate experimental methods for measuring marginal utility in intertemporal settings. Our
results can shed light on this discussion by refocusing the debate on the empirical predictive
power of the marginal utility estimates from the CTB on large stakes intertemporal financial
choices.28
27

In the proposed method of Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao, Huang and Wakker (2016), subjects trade off streams
of the same payment over time, to elicit discounting without measuring the shape of utility. When trading off
streams of the same payment, the utility of that payment is cancelled with respect to any discounted utility
calculation if stationarity of utility is assumed.
28
In a small-stakes settings, Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) show that the CTB task does have enhanced
predictive power relative to the method of Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008).
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In the specific context of CTB designs, researchers have argued that the complexity of the
decision environment confuses subjects and confounds inference (Chakraborty, Calford, Fenig
and Halevy, 2017; Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2012; Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao, Huang and
Wakker, 2016).29 Chakraborty, Calford, Fenig and Halevy (2017) argue that a design which
permits interior allocations can lead to decision errors. Those authors support this point by
noting that in the data of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), when subjects face a CTB and
a standard binary choice task with the same payment dates and interest rates, they do not
always choose the same option conditional on choosing a corner in the CTB.30 Harrison, Lau
and Rutstrom (2012) and Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao, Huang and Wakker (2016) also argue that
the design element of allowing interior allocations renders the CTB too complicated for subjects
to understand.
Our results indicate that complexity and potential confusion is not an overwhelming challenge for inference with the CTB. Section 3.1 (see Tables 2-3 and Figure 3) shows that interior
choices, the element of the CTB that has been critiqued, correlate highly with subsequent plan
choice. The corresponding relationship between estimates of diminishing marginal utility and a
preference for smoothness in plan choice is bolstered by additional links between patience and
plan choice. For such correlations to arise via some common confusion seems unlikely.
29

Attema, Bleichrodt, Gao, Huang and Wakker (2016) argue that the complexity of the CTB should favor
methods that do not rely on utility measurements: “This method is simpler than existing methods because it
does not need information about utility. Consequently, the experimental tasks are easier for subjects, researchers
have to ask fewer questions, and the measurements are not distorted by biases in utility.” (p. 1490)
30
It should be stated that the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) data is far from ideal for making this comparison
as their CTB was implemented with choices over experimental tokens on a computer and their binary choices
were over money implemented in a paper-and-pencil Multiple Price List (MPL) design. The data of Andreoni,
Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) are better suited to making such comparisons, having both CTB and MPL designs
with the same interest rates, payment values, and paper-and-pencil interface. There, conditional upon choosing
a corner in the CTB, the same bundle is chosen in the MPL in over 90% of observations.
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B

Additional Tables and Figures Noted in Text

Table B.1: Summary of the parameters for the modified CTB
1

2

3

4

t

0

0

35

35

k

35

63

35

63

MRT1

1.05

1.00

1.05

1.00

MRT2

1.11

1.05

1.11

1.05

MRT3

1.18

1.11

1.18

1.11

MRT4

1.25

1.33

1.25

1.33

MRT5

1.43

1.67

1.43

1.67

MRT6

1.82

2.22

1.82

2.22
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Figure B.1: Histogram of fraction of monotonic choices by individuals for full sample and
analysis sample.

C
C.1

Additional Exercises and Robustness Tests
Individual Measurement Error

Our aggregate analysis provides statistical comparisons for estimated preference parameters
and plan values between individuals who chose smooth plans and those who chose the single
plan. As such, this aggregate analysis accounts for estimation error in the preferences and
plan values. The individual analysis presented in Table 5 show differences in preferences and
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plan values at the point estimate of individual preferences. Individual estimation error could
potentially alter the conclusions reached.
To evaluate robustness to individual measurement error in preferences, we draw 1,000 simulants for each of the 348 individuals in our individual analysis. Each simulation has parameter
values drawn from a multivariate normal distribution centered at the point estimates for α
and δ of the individual with covariance matrix determined by the estimated covariance matrix for the individual. At these simulated parameter values, we construct a simulated Plan
Value Ratio (PVR). Figure C.1 graphs the 348 × 1000 = 348,000 simulated PVR values separately by individuals who chose the single plan or one of the smooth payment plans. Allowing
for the variation in PVRs induced by individual estimation errors, we continue to reject the
null hypothesis of equal distributions of PVRs across these two groups (Mann–Whitney test,
z = −103.48, (p < 0.001)).
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Figure C.1: Simulated Plan Value Ratios (PVRs) for chose single and chose smooth groups.

C.2

Transaction Costs and Plan Choice

Our implemented CTB design for eliciting preferences focuses on equalizing transaction costs
at each payment date by providing minimum payments. For payment plan choice, we do
not require subjects to receive some minimum payment at every potential date. As such,
some payment plans may incur different transaction costs than others. For example, the single
payment plan only requires one trip to the bank, while the twelve payment plan requires twelve.
These additional transaction costs are not modeled in our main analysis estimating plan values.
In Figure C.2, we incorporate transaction costs into our analysis determining plan values.
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First, we generate 10,000 simulants with preference parameters (α, δ) drawn from the multivariate normal distribution with means and standard deviations determined by the variancecovariance matrix of the estimates reported in Table 4. We do this for the full analysis sample
(top panel), as well as separately for the group that chose the single payment plan (mid panel)
and for the group that chose one of the smooth payment plans (bottom panel). For each
simulant, we first calculate plan values absent any transaction costs and provide histograms
of which plan has the highest value. Echoing the results of Table 4, the aggregate estimates
indicate a preference for smooth plans; and those individuals who chose single or smooth plans
are overwhelmingly predicted to so.
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Figure C.2: Predicted plan choices from simulations based on group estimates.
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The left hand side of Figure C.2 also reveals a stark prediction. All simulants are either
predicted to have the single or the twelve payment plan as the highest value plan. Indeed, within
the range of our parameters, a stark cutoff exists in (α, δ) space below which the single plan is
predicted to have the highest value, otherwise the twelve payment plan is valued highest. In
Figure C.3, Panel A, we make this clear by simulating 100,000 preferences from two independent
uniform distributions: α ∈ [0.1, 1] and δ ∈ [0.8, 1.1]. Either the single plan or the twelve
payment plan should be chosen with no intermediate choices generated. Figure C.3, Panel B
also plots the next best alternative, with intermediate options of the two and six payment plans
being the second highest value plan for large swathes of the parameter space.

Figure C.3: Simulated Preferences and Plan Choice.
Next, we incorporate transaction costs into the analysis. For each payment date presribed
by a plan, we add a single random transaction cost parameter drawn from normal distribution
with a mean of GTQ15 and a standard deviation of GTQ10. Any negative cost is set to zero,
truncating the distribution.31 This transaction cost is then included in each simulant’s plan
31

We restrict to non-negative transaction costs by iteratively taking the mass below zero and re-drawing
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values.
Using the same simulants that generated the left side of Figure C.2 and transaction costs,
we then calculate payment plan values including these transaction costs as:
"
Vj,i =

l
X

#1/αi
δik−s (xt+k;j − 1xt+k,j >0 ∗ ci )αi

,

(4)

k=s

where i refers to the simulant, and ci is the simulated transaction cost incorporated into plan
j if a payment is prescribed. The right side of Figure C.2 shows the influence of these modest
transaction costs. Generally, transaction costs increase the attractiveness of intermediate plans
with fewer payments. Moreover, for those individuals who chose the single payment plan, it
makes that plan even more attractive.
The analysis to here shows that moderate transaction costs may make intermediate and
single plans more attractive, but incorporating such transaction costs into the analysis does
not alter our core conclusion. Plan values for individuals who chose single and smooth plans
are predicted to deviate substantially.
Interestingly, these transactions costs may actually be an important driver of behavior
within the smooth plans. Only a small fraction of individuals actually choose the twelve payment plan. Moreover, following the results in Tables 2 and 5, correlations exist between CTB
behavior and plan choice within intermediate plans. For smooth payment plan subjects, the
number of payments correlates significantly with estimates of α and δ 30 .32 Such correlations
would be expected if there was an overarching avoidance of the most smooth plan due to frequent incurrence of transaction costs. As a further investigation of the possibility that plan
choice is related to transaction costs empirically, we asked subjects the amount of time it would
for that from a the same normal distribution until there is no mass at negative transaction costs. Naturally,
the resulting distribution is shifted slightly to the right (mean of GTQ16.39, median of GTQ15.89), has lower
variance (standard deviation of GTQ8.77) and is slightly skewed (skewness of 0.37). These additional simulated
costs are arbitrary and non-exhaustive of all possible costs and benefits that can affect payment plan choice in
addition to preference parameters.
32
A regression of number of payments on these two preference parameters and a constant for the smooth
payment subsample yields a coefficient for δ 30 of −0.11 (robust s.e. = 0.02) and a coefficient for α of −3.88 (1.64).
Both coefficients differ significantly from zero at the one percent level.
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take to get to a bank. For the subsample who chose smooth payment plans, regressing the
number of payments on an indicator for whether the individual would need more than 30 minutes to get to the bank (controlling for estimated preference parameters) yields a coefficient of
−0.495 (robust s.e. = 0.19), which is statistically significant at the one percent level.

C.3

Robustness to Alternate Estimation Strategies

Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015) discuss a number of
estimation strategies for CTB data. Although we follow Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015)
in using simple OLS analysis for prediction, our exercise could be conducted with alternative
methods. In Table C.1, we provide an analysis using non-linear least squares estimation of the
solution function for x∗t ,
x∗t =

ω + (P β t0 δ k )1/(α−1) (M − ω)
,
1 + (P β t0 δ k )1/(α−1)

where ω is a Stone–Geary background parameter term (Geary, 1950; Stone, 1954) that is frequently found in the literature and imposed to be either minus some daily level of consumption
or a minimum subsistence level (Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom, 2008; Andreoni, Kuhn
and Sprenger, 2015) or estimated from the data (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012). With ω = 0,
we reproduce the directional differences in curvature and discounting previously observed, although with less precision. And, although differences in plan values are observed across groups,
the single payment choice group is estimated to value smooth payment plans more than the
single payment plan. Varying the assumption of the background parameter ω, as in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012), alters the conclusions with respect to curvature, discounting and plan
values. For example, with ω = 10, curvature estimates are quite similar across the payment
groups, while differences in discounting and plan values are broadly in line with our prior OLS
estimates. Estimating ω from the data33 we find ω around GTQ13-14 for each group. Based
on monthly income data, this is around one-third to one-half of a day’s household income, a
33

Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) note that unlike the other parameters of interest, there is no experimental
variation that identifies ω. It is identified from the functional form.
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plausible minimum subsistence level. When estimating ω, we find curvature estimates close to
those from our initial specifications similar across groups, clear differences in discounting across
groups, and plan values broadly in line with our prior estimates.
Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2012) present an alternative estimation strategy rather than
the strategies implemented by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), which yields increasing, rather
than modestly diminishing, marginal utility. The estimation strategy is similar to the random
choice models of Holt and Laury (2002) and Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2008),
applied to the Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) data.34 Recent theoretical work has called into
question the use of such random choice models for estimating preferences given a demonstrated
non-monotonicity in choice probabilities with respect to key parameters of interest (Apesteguia
and Ballester, 2018). Nonetheless, Table C.2 compares the results of the Harrison, Lau and
Rutstrom (2012) estimator with the OLS estimator presented in Table 4, and the NLS estimator
presented in Table C.1. As in Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2012), using such ML methods on
CTB data yields convex utility estimates, as the estimator attempts to match the slight majority
(54%) of observations at budget corners. These convex utility estimates are virtually unaffected
by the differential price sensitivity across groups, with both single and smooth payment subjects
having substantial estimated convexity that cannot be differentiated statistically. Although
there are sizable estimated differences in discounting across groups, the ML method overall
leads to sharp mispredictions for payment values. Both groups are predicted to value the single
payment contract substantially more than smooth contracts.35
34

From this exercise Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2012) conclude the following: “And we believe that rejecting
concave utility in favor of convex utility, in settings such as these, will strike most economists as a priori
implausible, and raise further questions about the comprehension of subjects of this new experimental task.”
(p. 21)
35
Estimating the model of Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2012), using only subjects that have more than 50%
interior allocations, yields results in-line with other estimates for the differences between smooth and single
payment groups. Results are available upon request.
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Table C.1: Alternative Estimation Strategies
Estimation Strategy

Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments

NLS
ω=0
(1)

NLS
NLS
NLS
Background Parameter (ω)
ω = 10
ω=5
ω = −5
(2)
(3)
(4)

0.762
(0.020)
0.737
(0.013)

0.856
(0.016)
0.867
(0.010)

0.812
(0.018)
0.805
(0.012)

0.711
(0.022)
0.665
(0.015)

0.881
(0.013)
0.904
(0.006)

0.924
(0.017)
0.992
(0.009)

0.931
(0.015)
0.983
(0.006)

0.928
(0.016)
0.976
(0.008)

0.922
(0.018)
0.997
(0.011)

0.933
(0.014)
0.982
(0.005)

1.095
(0.029)
1.068
(0.014)

1.075
(0.024)
1.040
(0.010)

1.084
(0.027)
1.054
(0.013)

1.103
(0.031)
1.080
(0.016)

1.070
(0.023)
1.031
(0.009)

Background Parameter: ω
Chose Single Payment

Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)

Estimated
(5)

13.352
(1.336)
14.363
(0.696)

Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR)
Chose Single Payment

NLS

1.315
(0.095)
1.729
(0.090)

1.087
(0.048)
1.215
(0.028)

1.179
(0.066)
1.370
(0.048)

1.500
(0.139)
2.252
(0.171)

1.044
(0.044)
1.126
(0.018)

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

1.11
(p = 0.29)
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth
; χ2 (1)
11.90
(p < 0.01)
H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
0.69
(p = 0.41)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
9.95
(p < 0.01)

0.30
0.11
2.99
(p = 0.58) (p = 0.74) (p = 0.08)
10.46
7.39
12.52
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
1.79
1.05
0.45
(p = 0.18) (p = 0.30) (p = 0.50)
5.31
5.48
11.65
(p < 0.05) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.01)

2.57
(p = 0.11)
10.48
(p < 0.01)
2.49
(p = 0.12)
2.99
(p < 0.10)

Notes: Estimates are based on non-linear least squares (NLS) regression of solution function with alternative values for a Stone–
Geary background parameter (ω), with standard errors that are clustered on individual level. Plan values are calculated from
non-linear combinations of estimated parameters.
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Table C.2: Comparison with ML Methods
Estimation Strategy
Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Noise Parameter: µ
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments

HLR (2012) MLE (ω = 0)
(1)

OLS (ω = 0)
(2)

NLS (estimated ω)
(3)

1.752
(0.169)
1.503
(0.089)

0.911
(0.007)
0.878
(0.007)

0.881
(0.013)
0.904
(0.006)

0.835
(0.043)
1.007
(0.023)

0.893
(0.029)
1.020
(0.023)

0.933
(0.014)
0.982
(0.005)

1.218
(0.088)
1.190
(0.045)

1.177
(0.056)
1.159
(0.032)

1.070
(0.023)
1.031
(0.009)

0.426
(0.066)
0.427
(0.046)

Background Parameter: ω
Chose Single Payment

13.352
(1.336)
14.363
(0.696)

Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR)
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth
; χ2 (1)

H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)

0.451
(0.038)
0.623
(0.040)

0.900
(0.064)
1.306
(0.085)

1.044
(0.044)
1.126
(0.018)

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

1.69
(p = 0.19)
12.20
(p < 0.01)
0.09
(p = 0.77)
9.59
(p < 0.01)

12.22
(p < 0.01)
12.12
(p < 0.01)
0.08
(p = 0.78)
14.48
(p < 0.01)

2.57
(p = 0.11)
10.48
(p < 0.01)
2.49
(p = 0.12)
2.29
(p < 0.10)

Notes: Estimates are based on Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods of Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2012) (HLR), ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression, or non-linear least squares (NLS) regression of solution function with standard errors that are clustered on
individual level. Plan values are calculated from non-linear combinations of estimated parameters.
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C.4

Exploring Alternative Information on Curvature

Our exercise identifies curvature from a desire to smooth intertemporal payments in the CTB.
Experimental designs that leave curvature unmeasured require additional assumptions to make
predictions for decisions such as payment plan choice. Table C.3 examines the effects of imposing alternative assumptions for curvature. Specifically, we fix α at different values and show
that these assumptions deeply influence the results.
In the first column we impose α = 0.5 for all subjects.36 In line with the discussed confounding effects of curvature, if marginal utility diminishes at the implied rate, individuals
are estimated to be extremely patient. Indeed, for the 78% of subjects who choose smooth
payments we estimate an aggregate monthly discount factor of around 1.7 and a remarkably
high degree of future bias. Furthermore, the implied valuations for smooth payments strain
plausibility with both smooth and single payment groups estimated to value smooth payment
plans much more than the single payment.37
In columns (2) to (5) of Table C.3, we fix α at additional values of 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, and
0.99. This assumption tunes estimates of patience, payment plan values, and the differences
between groups. Based upon the assumption of curvature, researchers can predict that both
groups will prefer smooth contracts or both groups will prefer single contracts with potentially
indiscernible differences in the strength of preference. Only in special cases of α at around 0.9
will the assumed value of curvature correctly tune patience to successfully differentiate between
payment plan groups. Incidentally, as shown in column (6) of Table 7, this is close to what is
estimated on aggregate using curvature information inherent to our CTB elicitation strategy.
36

This is in line with estimates from risky choice tasks such as those estimated by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012); Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger (2015).
37
Given the prior findings on levels of risk aversion and a lack of correlation between risky choice tasks and
curvature in CTBs, this suggests that using risky choice information could lead to substantial misprediction for
such large-stakes intertemporal choices.
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Table C.3: Alternative Curvature Information

Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR)
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth
; χ2 (1)

(1)

(2)

Fixing α
(3)

(4)

(5)

Estimated α
(6)

0.500
(NA)
0.500
(NA)

0.750
(NA)
0.750
(NA)

0.900
(NA)
0.900
(NA)

0.950
(NA)
0.950
(NA)

0.990
(NA)
0.990
(NA)

0.887
(0.005)
0.887
(0.005)

1.051
(0.185)
1.718
(0.140)

0.952
(0.084)
1.216
(0.050)

0.897
(0.031)
0.989
(0.016)

0.879
(0.015)
0.923
(0.008)

0.865
(0.003)
0.873
(0.001)

0.901
(0.036)
1.007
(0.020)

2.822
(0.785)
1.988
(0.226)

1.657
(0.231)
1.391
(0.079)

1.204
(0.067)
1.122
(0.025)

1.083
(0.030)
1.045
(0.012)

0.994
(0.006)
0.987
(0.002)

1.238
(0.077)
1.144
(0.029)

7.434
(6.882)
198.778
(128.823)

1.471
(0.369)
3.350
(0.527)

0.924
(0.069)
1.155
(0.046)

0.824
(0.028)
0.909
(0.015)

0.760
(0.005)
0.773
(0.002)

0.955
(0.085)
1.239
(0.069)

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

9,789
408

6.49
6.46
6.44
6.44
6.47
(p < 0.05) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.05) (p < 0.05)
H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
1.04
1.19
1.30
1.35
1.48
(p = 0.31) (p = 0.27) (p = 0.25) (p = 0.25) (p = 0.22)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
2.20
8.54
7.83
7.13
6.61
(p = 0.14) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.05)

6.51
(p < 0.05)
1.29
(p = 0.26)
7.91
(p < 0.01)

Notes: Not Available (NA). Estimates are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (3) with standard errors that are clustered
on individual level. Utility estimates and plan values are calculated from non-linear combinations of regression coefficients. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are calculated using the delta method. Null hypotheses tested after regression of equation (3) with interactions for plan
choice with k, t0 and ln(P ), with standard errors clustered at individual level.
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C.5

Robustness to Alternate Presentation Treatments for CTB

Our CTB design features several, cross-randomized presentation treatments. As noted in Section 2.2, subjects were randomized into seeing budgets either with the sooner amount increasing
or the sooner amount decreasing as they moved down the task; seeing budgets in order of increasing or decreasing marginal rate of transformation, P ; and seeing the budget options with
or without their participation payment included. In Table C.4, we present preference estimates
separately for each of these treatments, analogous to Table 4.
Treatments of altering the order of the sooner amount and the marginal rate of transformation do have an influence on behavior and estimated preferences. Decreasing sooner
amount, decreasing P , and including participation payments, appear to have made subjects
somewhat less sensitive to P and more patient. Importantly, however, differences between
single and smooth payment choice groups are observed for all specifications. Individuals who
chose smooth payments are estimated to have lower values of α and higher values of δ in every
group. Differences in marginal utility and discounting estimates between payment groups are
significant at conventional levels in four of the six specifications.
These results help to ensure that the differences between payment groups are not localized
to a single type of CTB elicitation. It is important to recognize, however, that the presentational treatments do alter the levels of estimated preferences and so alter the estimated values
of smooth and single payment plans. In every specification, individuals who chose smooth payments are estimated to have values for average smooth payment plans that are higher than the
value for the single payment plan. However, in two of the six specifications, subjects who chose
single payment plans are estimated to value smooth payment plans substantially more highly.
This may be instructive for knowing which type of presentation is most well-calibrated for
subsequent prediction. Our findings suggest that presentations with sooner amounts increasing
within budgets, P increasing across budgets, and participation payments that are absent from
the presentation may be best suited for delivering well-calibrated estimates and discernible
differences across groups.
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Table C.4: Aggregate Parameter Estimates by Treatment
Sooner Amount
Increasing Decreasing

Curvature: α
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Monthly Discount Factor: δ 30
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Present Bias: β
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
Plan Value Ratio (PVR)
Chose Single Payment
Chose Smooth Payments
# Observations
# Clusters
H0 : αChoseSingle = αChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
30
30
H0 : δChoseSingle
= δChoseSmooth
; χ2 (1)

H0 : βChoseSingle = βChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)
H0 : P V RChoseSingle = P V RChoseSmooth ; χ2 (1)

P Order
Participation Payment
Increasing Decreasing
Absent
Included

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.925
(0.007)
0.901
(0.006)

0.884
(0.016)
0.848
(0.013)

0.918
(0.007)
0.880
(0.009)

0.898
(0.014)
0.875
(0.009)

0.916
(0.009)
0.882
(0.009)

0.905
(0.011)
0.873
(0.010)

0.836
(0.029)
1.004
(0.025)

1.013
(0.063)
1.040
(0.041)

0.837
(0.034)
1.004
(0.032)

0.996
(0.055)
1.036
(0.032)

0.852
(0.033)
0.973
(0.027)

0.937
(0.048)
1.067
(0.037)

1.124
(0.068)
1.135
(0.038)

1.286
(0.100)
1.189
(0.053)

1.266
(0.075)
1.219
(0.051)

1.039
(0.084)
1.102
(0.038)

1.241
(0.063)
1.082
(0.040)

1.114
(0.088)
1.238
(0.050)

0.776
(0.052)
1.196
(0.080)

1.268
(0.225)
1.469
(0.192)

0.785
(0.060)
1.246
(0.112)

1.179
(0.183)
1.369
(0.130)

0.814
(0.064)
1.148
(0.086)

1.008
(0.123)
1.490
(0.162)

4,606
192

5,183
216

4,990
208

4,799
200

4,631
193

5,158
215

6.79
(p < 0.01)
18.15
(p < 0.01)
0.02
(p = 0.88)
19.63
(p < 0.01)

2.97
(p = 0.09)
0.12
(p = 0.73)
0.74
(p = 0.39)
0.46
(p = 0.50)

10.39
(p < 0.01)
12.62
(p < 0.01)
0.27
(p = 0.60)
13.16
(p < 0.01)

1.84
(p = 0.18)
0.40
(p = 0.53)
0.46
(p = 0.50)
0.72
(p = 0.40)

7.43
(p < 0.01)
7.84
(p < 0.01)
4.52
(p < 0.05)
9.66
(p < 0.01)

4.94
(p < 0.05)
4.49
(p < 0.05)
1.51
(p = 0.22)
5.62
(p < 0.05)

Notes: Estimates are based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of equation (3) with standard errors that are clustered on individual
level. Utility estimates and plan values are calculated from non-linear combinations of regression coefficients. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are calculated using the delta method. Null hypotheses tested after regression of equation (3) with interactions for plan choice with
k, t0 and ln(P ), with standard errors clustered at individual level.
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D

Translated instructions

The instructions, translated from the original Spanish, are presented in the following.

D.1

General Instructions

• Now, we will start the experiment. The rules of the experiment are:
1. You cannot talk to any participant of the session.
2. You cannot use cellphones.
3. All the data and answers that you provide to us will be totally CONFIDENTIAL.
• The experiment consists of three parts.
1. By participating in and completing the three parts of the experiment, you will receive
Q50.00. (The Q50.00 will be divided into two payments).
2. In addition, you can also earn additional money.
• Ways to obtain the payment.
1. You can choose the method of payment. Check/Deposit in the bank BANRURAL.38
2. The payment will be made on two different dates. A first payment will be made
BEFORE (Today or in 5 weeks), and a second payment will be made AFTER (In 5
or 9 weeks after the first payment).

D.2

Instructions for the first part of the experiment: modified CTB

• General Instructions Part 1
1. The first part consists of 24 questions.
38

In initial sessions, participants had the option of deposits in their bank account or being paid via postdated
checks. Since no participants in these initial sessions opted for deposits, we did not offer this option in later
sessions.
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2. Each question has 6 options.
3. For each question you should choose the option you prefer.
4. When finished, we will randomly select one of the questions and we will pay the
option you chose for that question.
Example:39
• Each option is numbered on the bottom. Also, each option represents two quantities you
can receive: a first payment (in this case, today), and also a second payment (in this case,
in 5 weeks).
• The amounts in each option do not include the payment for participation.
• Option 1
1. You would receive Q80 today.
2. You would receive Q0 in 5 weeks.
• Option 2
1. You would receive Q64 today.
2. You would receive Q20 in 5 weeks.
• Option 3
1. You would receive Q48 today.
2. You would receive Q40 in 5 weeks.
• Option 4
1. You would receive Q32 today.
2. You would receive Q60 in 5 weeks.
39

The example is modified according to the treatment.
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• Option 5
1. You would receive Q16 today.
2. You would receive Q80 in 5 weeks.
• Option 6
1. You would receive Q0 today.
2. You would receive Q100 in 5 weeks.
• You must choose an option. Suppose you chose Option 3. Today, you will receive Q48,
and also, in 5 weeks, you will receive Q40.
• Note that the options in this case allow you to receive up to Q100 if you receive it all in 5
weeks, or you can receive a maximum of Q80 if you receive everything today. There are
also intermediate options. Today you can obtain Q48, and in 5 weeks Q40, for a total of
Q88. The total increases as you want to receive more money in FIVE weeks.
• The dates of the first and the second payment vary with the question:
1. Questions 1-6: In the first 6 Questions you choose between a FIRST payment to
receive TODAY, and a SECOND payment to receive in FIVE WEEKS.
2. Questions 7-12: In Questions 7-12 you choose between a FIRST payment to receive
TODAY, and a SECOND payment to receive in NINE WEEKS.
3. Questions 13-18: In Questions 13-18 you choose between a FIRST payment to receive
in FIVE WEEKS, and a SECOND payment to receive in TEN WEEKS.
4. Questions 19-24: In Questions 19-24 you choose between a FIRST payment to receive
in FIVE WEEKS, and a SECOND payment to receive in FOURTEEN WEEKS.
• A draw will be held to determine which question will be paid to you.40 The 24 questions
will not be paid to you. Only the option that is selected in the draw will be paid to you.
40

At this point, a bingo cage with 24 balls inside is shown to the participants.
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• The dates when the FIRST and the SECOND payments are made will depend on the
draw results.
• If question 14 is selected in the draw, then the option you choose in question 14 will
determine how much you will receive in FIVE WEEKS, and how much you will receive
in TEN WEEKS.
• Your payment will be made through Banrural bank, via either deposits to your account
or checks. In both cases, the money will be available on the two indicated dates (for your
safety, all the dates are business days). The dates will be determined by the question
selected in the draw.
• The payment for participating will be divided into two parts, and they will be paid on
the dates when the payments of the question selected in the draw are paid.
• So, what will be the amount you receive?
1. You will receive the amount that the selected option indicates. Also, you will receive
Q50 for your participation payment. This additional Q50 will be split between the
first and the second payment.
• At this point, we will do a practice.
• The following three questions will not be among the questions entered into the draw.
• During the practice, you can ask questions at any time.

D.3

General instructions Part 2

• The second part of the experiment consists of a draw.
• The amount is Q1, 200.
• In the bingo cage, there will be 30 numbered balls. If any person has the number that
comes out of the bingo cage, that person will be the winner of the draw.
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You can choose:
• A draw where if you win, you will receive Q1, 200. You should choose how would you like
to receive the Q1, 200, if you are the winner:
1. Receive it all in one payment.
2. Receive biweekly payments of Q100 for six months.
3. You can choose Q400 every two months for six months, etc.
• All payments add up to Q1, 200. The only thing that changes is how many payments you
receive.
• You will receive the next payment on the 22nd of this month.41
• The payments from the draw will be made through Banrural bank, with checks. The
amount of payments and the dates to be made will be according to your choice.
• Practice for comprehension of the instructions.
– At this moment, we will do a practice.
– The following three questions will not be part of the questions in the draw.
– During the practice, you can ask questions at any time.

41

This date varied with the date of the session.

